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instant case, decided that the defendant acted as an attorney and not as
a scrivener, 1 the case, as decided, appears to admit to little controversy.
A civil action for damages by an injured third party is thus added to the
list of liabilities to which a layman practicing law subjects himself.12
The requirement of privity of contract and the classification of a legatee
under a will as an incidental beneficiary, present vast bulwarks to an intended
beneficiary seeking recovery from a negligent draftsman. As the court points
out in the instant case, "to say that only the testator has been wronged is
contrary to fact and legal fiction."'3 It is submitted that the injured legatee
should be protected by holding the negligent draftsman, whether layman or
attorney, liable in an action based on contract or tort.
PAUL E. ROBDE
CONSTITUTIrONAL LAW - PROCESS OR NOTICE - IN PERSONAMI JUDGIENT ON
PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS OUTSIDE STATE NOT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
- Defendant, a resident of Wisconsin, was engaged in the business of selling
appliances. He was personally served with a summons in that state by
plaintiff, a resident of Illinois, who alleged injuries caused by defendant's
agent in delivering a stove to plaintiff in Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that the 1955 amendments to Section 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act,1 which authorize the entry of a judgment in personam on personal serv-
ice of summons on a nonresident outside the state, does not violate the 14th
11. Compare the instant case with Mickel v. Murphy, 305 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1957) :n
which the court held that the defendant acted as a scrivener and not as an attorney, and
was therefore not liable in a tort action, for negligent preparation of a will.
12. It is an interesting contrast to note that there is no such liability in the case of a
negligent attorney, no matter how great his negligence. See Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195
(1879) (Defendant was employed by X to examine and report on X's title to certain
property. He certified the title to be good and the property unencumbered, while actually
X had previously conveyed away the property by duly recorded conveyance which de-
fendant, with a reasonable degree of care, could have ascertained. Plaintiff, in reliance upon
this certification,-loaned money to X, who became insolvent, and sought recovery from
defendant. The court held that, there being neither fraud, collusion nor falsehood by the
defendant, nor privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant, he was not liable to
plaintiff for any loss sustained by reason of the defective certificate.) In Buckley v. Gray,
110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895), defendant was employed by plaintiff's mother to draw
a will, by the terms of which the plaintiff and a brother were to share equally
in her estate, to the exclusion of the children of a deceased brother. Defendant had plain-
tiff sign as a subscribing witness, thus rendering the provisions of the will void as to the
plaintiff, and permitting the deceased brother's children to take one-half of the estate.
Plaintiff brought action to recover for the attorney's' negligence, but the court held, that
an attorney is liable for negligence in the conduct of his professional duties, arising only
from ignorance or want of care, to his client alone, that is, to the one between whom
and the attorney the contract of employment and service existed, and not the third oarties.
The only exceptions arise where the attorney has been guilty of fraud, collusion, or a
malicious or tortious act.
13. 310 P.2d 63, 68 (Cal. 1957).
1. Ill. Ann. Stat. § 17 (1955) "Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
thereby submits his person, . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any
cause of action arising from . . . the transaction of any business within this State; the
commission of a tortious act within this State; the ownership, use, or possession of any
real estate situated in this State; or contracting to insure any person, property or risk lo-
cated within this State at the time of contracting. Service of process . . . may be made by
personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, with the same force
and effect as though . . . served personally within this State."
1958] RECENT CASES
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Nelson v. Miller, 143
N.E.2d 673 (Ill. 1957).
A legislature's direct attempt to determine the situs of suit, by edict pro-
visions facilitatng court jurisdiction of fleeing nonresident defendants, is de-
signed mainly to prevent hardship to resident plaintiffs in transporting witnesses
and to, hasten the enforcement of remedies.
The precedent for this unique statute, which is reminiscent though an ex-
tended version of the Maryland2 and Vermont3 statutes subjecting foreign
corporations to suit within those states on the occasion of a tort being committed
there, is founded on the "minimum contact" doctrine.4 This doctrine was set
forth in the International Shoe Case,' which strictly involved a corporation,
but whose "tenor and philosophy of opinion leaves no doubt of intent that
its principles apply equally to nonresident individuals."' The International Shoe
decision discarded the historical "presence"7 theory and substituted a test of
fairness which questioned whether or not the corporation might reasonably be
required to defend where sued without offending substantial justice. s It has been
asserted that with the advent of this standard the question of forum non con-
veniens becomes the essential element of consideration by the courts.9 A current
trend' in state control over foreign corporations is exemplified by statutes
requiring the nonresident corporation to designate an agent on whom process
may be had.10 The reasoning behind th6se cases holding foreign corporations
2. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 88(d) (1951).
3. Vt. Rev. Stat. § 1562 (1947).
4. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) "Due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Scholnik v. National Airlines, 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955).
5. International Shoe C6. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) "To the extent
that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys
the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may
give rise to obligations, and so far as those obligations arise out of, or are connected with,
the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a
suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue." See
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 587 (1914).
6. See Cleary and Sider, Jr., Extended Jurisdictioial Bases for Illinois Courts, 50 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 599, 603 (1955).
7. For an example of the application of this theory, See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
733 (1877) (The Oregon Supreme Court held valid a personal judgment obtained in an
Oregon court by serving a non-resident defendant by publication of summons. The state
through its tribunals, could subject property situated within its confines and owned by
nonresidents to the payment of the demands of its own citizens.) "The exercise of that
jurisdiction would not infringe on the sovereignty of the state where the nonresidents were
domiciled. . . . and that every state owed protection to its own citizens." However, "where
the subject-matter of the suit involves merely a determination of the personal liability of
the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within he
state, or his voluntary appearance." But see Rosenberg Bros. '& Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.,
260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923).
8. Stretching the International Shoe, 50 Nw. U. L. Rev. 425 (1955).
9. See Compania de Astrol v. Boston Metals Co., 107 A.2d 357 (Md. 1954) A
Panamanian Corporation with no office in the United States and not "doing business" "n
Maryland was held amenable to suit in Maryland on the basis of a single contract entered
into in Maryland.; Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664
(1951) A foreign corporation subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the Vermont Courts by
the commission of a single tort within the territorial limits of the state. See also, Ruppert
v. Morrison, 117 Vt. 83, 85 A.2d 584 (1952).
10. See, e.g., N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c.10 2 , §§ 110, 112.
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amenable to process served on their agents is in part applicable to personal
defendants.11
It should be noted that bold legislation took place long before 194512
and that the pragmatic legislative trend illustrated by the principal case is but
a slight extension of former practice. Continued recognition of the nonresident
motorist statutes is persuasive authority in support of the proposition that
the commission of a single tort within the state is sufficient to satisfy the
"minimum contact" requirement.1 3 In the public interest the State may
"make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on
the part of both residents and nonresidents and makes no hostile discrimina-
tion against nonresidents . ..but tends to put them on the same footing as
residents."14 The courts determine due process mainly by looking to the
statutory provisions for satisfactory notice to the defendant; if the manner
of service is found applicable equally to the resident and nonresident and
there is every "reasonable probability" the defendant will receive actual
notice, the constitutionality of the statute will be upheld.1 5
Increased mobility of the population must inevitably give rise to more
numerous encounters between parties of diverse citizenship, and the accom-
panying legal claims which follow may be handled more expediently by the
type of statute which the far-sighted Illinois legislature has enacted.
JOAN M. COVEY
11. See Davidson v. Doherty, 214 Iowa 739, 241 N.W. 700 (1932) § 11079 of the
1927 Ioiva Code, which authorized service on an agent employed in an agency through
which business involved was transacted, when applied to nonresident defendants, was
held as not contravening the due process clause; Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195
P.2d 222 (1948) Where plaintiff served a non-designated agent of a nonresident, doing
business within the state, who had failed to comply with c.10, §§2,3 of the 1947 Laws
of Utah (now Rule 4 (e) (10) and Rule 17 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
1953) requiring designation of a person within the state as an agent for service of
process, the constitutionality of such act was upheld as being nondiscriminatory against
nonresidents and the failure of the nonresident to comply with the law cannot be used to
defeat the resident's right to claim benefit of the statute. "Where a cause of action arises
in the state against a personal defendant, it is not a taking of his propery without due process
to require the defendant carrier to here contest the action." See Restatement, Conflict of
Laws § 84 (1934, Supp. 1954). But see, Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1918).
12. See e.g., Sauders v. Londan Assur. Corp., 76 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1935); Rubine v.
Golberg, 9 N.J. Misc. 460, 154 Atl. 535 (1931) Where a New Jersey statute authorizing
service of process on the Secretary of State in damage suits against nonresident motorists
was held constitutional. The court relied upon the 1927 Hess v. Pawloski decision,
(274 U.S. 352). For a complete resum6 as to prior legislation, see 19 Iowa L. Rev. 421
(1934).
13. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); For example, of a nonresident motorist
statute, see N.D. Rev. Code § 28-0611 (1953 Supp.) "The use and operation . . . by
a nonresident or his agent, of a motor vehicle upon or over the highways of this state
shall be deemed an appointment . . . by such nonresident at any time, of the highway
commissioner of this state to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served
all legal process in any action or proceeding against him growing out of the use or
operation of the motor vehicle resulting in damages or loss to person or property, whether
the damage or loss occurs upon a public highway or upon public or private property, and
such use or operation shall constitute an agreement that any such process in any-action
against him which is so served shall have the same legal force and effect as if served upon
him personally .... "
14. See Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 13 at 356; See also Hendrick v. Maryland, 235
U.S. 610, 622 (1915).
15. Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (By implication).
